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PROJECTING BENEVOLENT POWER: TRANSFORMING AMERICA'S IMAGE FROM SUPERPOWER TO SUPERHERO
We're determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle, our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, and of overwhelming power on the other.
-General George C. Marshall
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Power can be either destructive or constructive. While often controversial, destructive power is not synonymous with bad. If ethically used to deter or destroy an evil, then it is good. For example, the penicillin destroyed the pneumonia and the child was saved. Constructive power is normally less controversial and generally considered good, but it too has can have pitfalls. For example, the doctor saved the man's life, but the man later sold drugs to children.
In the context of the nation state, military power traditionally is associated with destructive power, or hard power and its ability to "break things and kill people." Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the ability to fight the nation's wars are a core capability of every branch of service. But the military, especially the American military, is a very capable organization. As such, the DoD is equally capable of projecting constructive power, i.e. the ability to "make things and aid people." In this way it projects a form of soft power.
Diplomats, represented by the United States Department of State (DoS), are in many ways on the opposite spectrum of power projection. Traditionally, the DoS is associated with soft power. While diplomacy is the core capability of the statesman, the DoS is also responsible for the constructive powers of development and stabilization/reconstruction. In these areas, the DoS's capability faces the most challenges.
In his first year in office, President Barack Obama has outlined a vision according to which the United States will seek a more liberal grand strategy so as to be seen by the world not only as powerful, but as a benefactor. This will require a rebalancing of the tendency to favor realist superpower qualities associated in part with destructive hard power. To achieve his vision, the President will concentrate more effort on constructive soft power, that is, the power to help. The principle agents of foreign affairs in the executive branch are the Department of Defense (DoD) and the DoS. Herein lies the dilemma; DoD has great capability in constructive soft power, but is hindered by acceptability. DoS has more acceptability using constructive soft power, but currently lacks capability. If the current administration can mitigate this dilemma, it can evolve from simply a coercive superpower to what President Obama wants America to become, a benevolent superhero.
Towards an Obama Doctrine
In his January 2009 inaugural address a newly elected President Obama described America as "a friend of each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity," pledged "to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry On the surface, the acceptance speech for a Nobel Peace Prize seems an odd place to venerate the use of force in the form of destructive hard power. However, President Obama recognized pacifism and peace are not synonymous terms. "There will be times when nations -acting individually or in concert -will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified." He went on to cite examples, "The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans."
Expanding on his recognition that as head of state he may be called upon to confront evil as a vital national interest, he rejected the pacifist notion of never resorting to armed pallets, and loaded 587 trucks with supplies that included 93,000 sleeping bags and 292,000 blankets. The strategic gain however, was in public opinion. Before the earthquake, polls showed a U.S. approval rating by the Pakistani people at 23 percent.
By December of 2005, U.S. approval was over 50 percent. Military cargo planes delivered personnel, equipment, and other supplies; then returned to the U.S. with both injured and non-injured evacuees. Coastguard cutters and Navy ships responded with medical supplies, helicopters, and personnel, not to mention the ability to generate 400,000 gallons of fresh water a day from seawater. 19 Even a Global
Hawk spy drone from California, originally destined for Afghanistan, was sent with the capability to capture over 1000 high resolution photos a day over Port-au-Prince.
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Military personnel sent to Haiti welcomed the new mission, even in the midst of ongoing wars. Marine Captain Clark Carpenter captured the sentiment of his company.
"Marines are definitely warriors first, but we are equally as compassionate when we need to be, and this is a role that we like to show -a compassionate warrior that can reach out that helping hand to those who need it." 21 Clausewitz reminds us, "Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." 22 Likewise, everything in responding to a humanitarian crisis is simple, but given the many players involved and divergent interests, even the simplest things are Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen asserts, "There is no doubt that Abu Ghraib was a stain on our national character, and it reminded us yet again of the power of our actions.
The incidents there likely inspired many young men and women to fight against us, and they still do as a matter of fact." 39 In Abu Ghraib, the guards were members of the United States Army, but for a military commander, the fiduciary responsibility for jus in bello includes all personnel working for the DoD, including contractors, further complicating the problem. Tucker
Carlson, a journalist working in Iraq for Esquire magazine explains a tactical decision security contractors made trying to get gas from a civilian station outside of Baghdad.
The DoD contract stipulated fuel and billeting acquisitions were the responsibility of the contractor, not to be provided by any U.S. Government agency.
All four vehicles roared in at high speed. Two went directly to the pumps. Two formed mobile roadblocks near the entrance. (Security) contractors with guns jumped out and stopped traffic from coming in. Others took positions around the perimeter of the station…There was a large and growing crowd around us. It looked hostile. And no wonder. We'd swooped in and stolen their places in line, reminding them, as if they needed it, of the oldest rule there is: Armed people get to do exactly what they want; everyone else has to shut up and take it…There had been quite a few children there. I'd seen them watching as we forced their fathers out of the way to get to the pumps. "We neutered their dads" (a security contractor) said. He was right. We had. And we'd had no choice. It was horrible if you thought about it. 40 The issue in this case is that a tactical level contracting decision not to provide fuel compelled security contractors to make unethical decisions, at least from the occupied population's point of view. The security contractors knew aggressive tactics at the gas pumps were ethically questionable; "neutering" the Iraqi man in front of his children was not the intent. Given the choice, the contractor would have probably preferred to use safer locations within DoD or other government compounds. However, because of the terms of the contract and security concerns when at the civilian pumps, they felt they "had no choice." Today it is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative --as central to advancing
American interests and solving global problems as diplomacy or defense."
Unfortunately, this is the "herding cats" problem. Many of the more liberal NGOs will continue to refuse to give credit to the U.S. government, and especially the military. 47 She explains development needs to be "the third pillar" of foreign policy. "The work of…development experts helps make future military action more remote. It is much cheaper to pay for development up front than to pay for war over the long run." transfer authority for reconstructions, stabilization, and security purposes. 58 While something is better than nothing, 250 active personnel in the CRC cannot compare to the 1.4 million active duty personnel in DoD. 59 there are many obstacles to broad based institutional support, i.e. acceptability. In an address to the National Defense University, Gates states, "Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry and in Congress." 67 He goes on to state, "My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support -including in the Pentagon -for the capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of mission we are most likely to undertake in the future." 68 Economic issues will put pressure on the DoD to make tuff decisions on priorities. In his annual CJCS policy guidance letter for 2009-2010, Admiral Mullen notes, "The country faces mounting deficits and growing debt. That will require difficult budget decisions for our government. As we carry out our assigned missions and reset a tired force, we must guard against growing hollow. The quality of the force remains paramount." 69 
Conclusion
While Admiral Mullen most certainly embraces the stability role of the military, if pressed to make an either or choice, it is very likely that the Chairman will face enormous pressure to retain "quality" in the traditional role of the military as a combat force first.
Some argue that not since NSC68 have we had a cohesive grand strategy that plays to our strengths. President Obama makes the case our strength is really our national character. Despite our great power and ability to conquer and destroy, we hold back, determined to be a force of good for the world. Likewise, our hard power capability should not dictate our primary strategy. In the words of General Abizaid, "What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide. It's an idea often overlooked by people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks." 70 America's great conventional warfare force will be avoided, in much the same way the French Maginot line was bypassed during WWII, and our enemies will find ways to avoid our strengths and attack by another means.
While these attacks will come in many forms, discrediting our national character will always be a prime target.
Moving America from superpower to superhero is a herculean task. 
